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Abstract
Dynamic game with changing leader is studied on the example of R&D co-opetition struc-
ture. The leader benefits from higher followers’ innovations rate and followers are enjoying
a spillover from the leader. Leadership changes because of asymmetric efficiency of invest-
ments of players. It is demonstrated that under sufficiently asymmetric players there is no
long-run leader in this game and all players act as followers. Moreover this outcome may
be the socially optimal one. In decentralised setting additional complex types of dynamics
are observed: permanent fluctuations around symmetric (pseudo)equilibrium and chaotic
dynamics. This last is possible only once strategies of players are interdependent. Coop-
erative solution is qualitatively similar for any number of players while market solution is
progressively complex given all players are asymmetric. Results are extended to an arbitrary
linear-quadratic multi-modal differential game with spillovers and the structure necessary
for the onset of non-deterministic chaos is discussed.
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1 Introduction
Many economic phenomena are described by piecewise dynamics. This relates to changing
leadership in dynamic competition, intellectual property rights reforms leading to the change in
regime of the industry and changes in government economic policy in general.
Many models in the literature describe various economic areas with the help of such systems
(such as technology catch-up across countries (Motta, Thisse, and Cabrales 1997), change in
industrial leadership (Giachetti 2013), technology leap-frogging within industries (Bondarev
2016), (Dawid, Kopel, and Kort 2013) and etc.). However little attention has been paid to the
global dynamics of such systems with asymmetric actors. Yet the dynamic properties of such
piecewise systems may have a profound impact on our treatment of the efficiency of economic
regulation and types of this regulation necessary to correct potential market inefficiencies. In
particular, growing complexity of market interactions may call to new types of interventions
which are yet to be developed.
In this paper I make use of some recent findings in piecewise-smooth dynamical systems,
(Dixon 1995), (Di Bernardo, Budd, Champneys, Kowalczyk, Nordmark, Olivar, and Piiroinen
2008), (Jeffrey and Colombo 2009) and (Colombo and Jeffrey 2011) and apply them to the
standard framework of R&D differential game like (Bondarev 2016) along with learning-by-
doing effects as modelled in (Greiner and Bondarev 2017). I show that the growing complexity
of r&d may lead to emergence of some complex dynamics as an emergent technical change
property, see (Antonelli 2016) for discussion on this issue.
The baseline framework closely follows that of (Bondarev and Greiner 2017). Some (ar-
bitrary) number of R&D firms is engaged both in quality-improving innovations for existing
products and in introduction of new products to the market. While firms jointly develop the
range of new products, they independently develop all existing products. In that paper only
the decentralised open-loop Nash equilibria are analysed and the multiplicity of these equilibria
emerging due to learning-by-doing effects are studied. Present paper rather concentrates on
the emergent properties of the game because of the piecewise-smooth nature of the dynamical
system and explores differences in cooperative and non-cooperative solutions.
It builds up on the results of (Gromov and Gromova 2017) on multi-modal differential games
and contributes further to our understanding of the potential types of dynamics in such games.
In particular, the results of the aforementioned paper remain valid only for special configuration
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of the global dynamics whereas generically the emergence of the so-called Teixeira singularity,
(Teixeira 1990) is to be expected.
On the example of the aforementioned baseline model I demonstrate that the presence of
asymmetry across firms may lead to profound differences in qualitative behavior of the market.
However the result itself is more general and applies to any piecewise-defined market dynamics
with asymmetric actors.
The paper contributes first to the general field of multi-modal differential games which
are gaining popularity in economic literature by considering new emergent types of dynamics.
Second, it contributes to the R&D policy debate by demonstrating new source of market inef-
ficiency stemming from the asymmetry of firms. Third, it demonstrates the ambiguous role of
the competition, since increasing number of firms may divert market equilibrium from the social
optimum.
In the next section the model setup is described, Section 3 describes the cooperative (central
planner) solution, Section 4 describes non-cooperative setting, Section 5 generalizes the results
obtained to an arbitrary multi-modal differential game and Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
Consider an industry with N multi-product firms engaged in R&D. These firms invest both in
horizontal innovations as well as in the improvement of the qualities of existing products, i.e. in
vertical innovations. As regards the structure of the R&D competition, assume that the firms
cooperate in the development of new products while the quality improvements of the products
are undertaken by each firm separately where the followers can benefit from the technological
leader through spillovers. The reason for this model structure is that it may be beneficial for firms
to cooperate when the development of new products is expensive even if they are competitors
otherwise. Further, there exists empirical evidence for such a behavior and in the literature one
sometimes refers to such a situation as co-opetition, i.e. the simultaneous existence of cooperation
and competition. (Gnyawali and Park 2009) find evidence that in particular small and medium
sized enterprises pursue such strategies because they face very large challenges in their attempt
to realize technological innovations and co-opetition is an effective means to achieve innovations.
But large firms often cooperate, too, in particular in high technology sectors because of several
challenges such as shortened product life cycles, the need for large investments in R&D and the
importance of technological standards, for example, see (Gnyawali and Park 2011).
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The formal intertemporal optimization problem closely follows of the firm k can be written
as
∀k ∈ N ⊂ IR++ : Jk def= max
u(·),g(·)
∫ ∞
0
e−rt
(∫ n(t)
0
[
qk(i, t)− 1
2
gk(i, t)
2
]
di− 1
2
uk(t)
2
)
dt. (1)
where
• qk(i, t) is the quality of the product(technology) i at time t achieved by the firm k;
• gk(i, t) are investments into quality qk(i, t) by the firm k at time t;
• n(t) is the currently available variety of technologies at t;
• uk(t) are investments by firm k at time t into the expansion of the variety of technologies
The evolution of the variety of products (technologies) is governed by joint investments of the
firms whereas the development of the quality of each new product is individual and subject to
the imitation effect:
n˙(t) =
(
N∑
k=1
αkuk(t)
)
− δn(t),
q˙k(i, t) = ψk(i)gk(i, t)− βkqk(i, t) + θmax {0, q−k(i, t)− qk(i, t)} , ∀i ∈ I ⊂ IR+. (2)
where
• αk is the efficiency of investments of firm k into variety expansion;
• ψk(i) is the (heterogeneous) efficiency of investments of firm k into quality of product i;
• βk is the depreciation rate of technology for the firm k;
• θ is the intensity of imitation effect.
The last term in the second equation of (2) gives the cross-technologies imitation effect,
where θ determines its magnitude.
The efficiency of investments into fundamental research αk is changing relative to the position
of the firm (whether it is the leader1 of R&D or not):
αk =
α
−
k , if k is not the leader;
α+k , if k is the leader
, α−k ≥ α+k (3)
1Observe that this is not a standard Stackelberg leadership, the notion of the leader is to be defined further
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with α−k − α+k being the efficiency asymmetry : the higher it is the more efficient is the firm in
increasing variety of technologies while being the follower.
It is thus assumed that followers are investing more in the fundamental research. This
assumption is in line with findings of (Bondarev 2014): under the close loop regime only imitators
are investing in new technologies creation and of (Acemoglu and Cao 2015) where only new
entrants are creating drastic innovations. In general we can define any αk efficiency, it suffices
to get different efficiencies of fundamental research in different regimes for every player.
This model is close to the setup in (Bondarev and Greiner 2017), where multiple regimes
are also obtained, but all players invest with similar efficiency in new products’ creation, i. e.
∀k : α−k = α+k = 1. As such that model is a degenerate case2 of the more general setup
considered here. That model is referred to as the baseline model throughout the text.
The efficiency of quality investments ψk(i) in general may take any form. To simplify the
analysis we assume it to be such that the resulting system is linear in the state n, that is
ψk(i) =
√
ψki+ γk. (4)
Specification (4) makes every regime of the game a linear-quadratic one, which is simple to
analyze. So current model focuses on the effect of the asymmetry across players, introduced by
αk term rather then on non-linearity effects. It turns out that these asymmetries play crucial
role in the complexity of potential developments.
We next define what is called leadership in this differential game. To this end restrict
attention to the case βk = β so that the leadership in development of each technology i cannot
change in time. Then we can define3
Definition 1 (Leader and followers).
The player k is the leader in development of technology i as long as this firm has maximal
efficiency of investments into i:
ψk(i) > ψ−k(i) (5)
2it will be demonstrated that this minor extension of asymmetry may lead to qualitatively different results
and substantially more complicated dynamics
3under different βk leadership may change for each i, as shown in (Bondarev 2016), for constant β across
players the leader in each technology remains constant as shown in (Bondarev 2014).
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Further, we impose a number of state and control constraints:
∀k ∈ N :
∀i ∈ I,∀t ≥ 0 : gk(i, t)|i>n(t)= 0; (6)
∀i ∈ I,∀t ≥ 0 : qk(i, t) ≥ 0; (7)
0 ≤ gk(i, t) <∞, 0 ≤ uk(t) <∞; (8)
n(t) ∈ I. (9)
Condition (6) states that each non-existent technology has zero investments while it is out of
the market. This makes sense from an economic point of view because it states that there is a
difference between the invention of a product and its innovation. Condition (7) states that level
of each technology cannot be negative. Condition (8) imposes non-negativity constraints and
the boundedness of investments, condition (9) constrains the variety to be positive real range
and maximum principle is understood in the sense of (Skritek, Stachev, and Veliov 2014), (Aseev
and Veliov 2015)4.
The functions ψk(i) determine the efficiency of R&D in quality innovations so that we refer
to them as efficiency functions. These are functions of the variety already invented and we
will allow for learning by doing effects implying that ψ(·) is an increasing function. This implies
catching-up in is possible the space of technologies, but not within each technology development.
Further, denote the firm k the leader across ik technologies as long as ψk(ik) > ψ−k(ik) i. e.
this firm has the highest efficiency of quality investments across all firms for the range ik ⊆ R>0.
Define the leader of the game at time t as follows:
Definition 2 (Leader of the game).
At time t the player k is called the leader of the game if this player’s efficiency of investments
into the next technology to be invented, n(t), is maximal:
ψk(n(t)) > ψ−k(n(t)) (10)
It follows that as long as ψk(i) are monotonic functions, the leader of the game is the leader
for all technologies i ≤ n(t).
Now, observe that even with monotonic efficiency functions as (4) of the same type there may
exist multiple regimes of this differential game, with low and high variety levels. In this model
4this last does not require compactness of the state space, transversality conditions converge to standard ones
with constant discount rate
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the multi-modality is the result solely of strategic effects and not of potential non-linearities in
learning functions and etc., since every mode of the game is linear-quadratic and is known to
have only one equilibrium point (see e. g. (Dockner, Jorgensen, Long, and Sorger 2000)).
In particular, if no intersection of efficiency functions exist, the game has a constant leader
(in the sense of (10)) and the dynamical system possesses only one steady state, n¯1. If there
exists an intersection, there is always at most one such (because of monotonicity and linearity of
efficiency functions), one player is the leader in the development of technologies up to the point
at which the efficiency functions intersect where the leadership changes. This piecewise-defined
system is more complicated and may be characterized by two steady-states. It is apparent that
once we have more than two firms, the number of potential equilibria is bounded from above
by this number N , but we limit the majority of exposition to the case of two firms. To this
end define the level of n(t) where leadership changes from one firm to the other as n∗ and
subsequently for the case of more than two firms by n∗k the level where firm k becomes the
leader.
It turns out that within this simple framework with linear-quadratic game around each of
the steady states we may observe rather interesting dynamics. Namely, once we have a changing
leadership, the game becomes a bi-modal one, (see (Gromov and Gromova 2017) for details)
and the governing dynamical system is of piecewise-smooth type. These systems may exhibit
so-called discontinuity-induced bifurcations (DIBS, see (Di Bernardo, Budd, Champneys, Kowal-
czyk, Nordmark, Olivar, and Piiroinen 2008) for details) which are recently actively studied.
In particular we are interested in the existence of so-called Teixeira singularity named after
the pioneering work (Teixeira 1990), since it was shown that it can exhibit non-deterministic
chaos, (Colombo and Jeffrey 2011). We thus study what economic implications this may have
for the associated R&D dynamics both from the decentralised and socially optimal viewpoints
and discuss what kind of additional economic regulation it may require.
In what follows both cooperative and non-cooperative setups are considered. In both cases
the overall game has two modes: normal one and the switching one defined as follows (following
(Di Bernardo, Budd, Champneys, Kowalczyk, Nordmark, Olivar, and Piiroinen 2008)):
Definition 3. The 2-firms game is in the normal mode, if its optimal trajectory never reaches
n∗. The game is in the switching mode, if its optimal trajectory visits n∗ at least once. It is in
the sliding mode if it stays at n∗ for positive time.
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The N -firms game is in the normal mode only if none of ∀k ∈ N : n∗k is never reached by
the optimal trajectory. Otherwise it is said to be in the switching mode. It is in the k-th sliding
mode if it stays at n∗k for positive time.
So in the sliding mode the dynamical system is characterized by the N − 1 manifold and
associated dynamics within it requires special treatment.
It will be demonstrated that both cooperative and non-cooperative dynamics are capable of
exhibiting switching modes and sliding modes as optimal ones. However, in cooperative game
the dimensionality of the resulting dynamical system is invariant to the number of firms, while
this is not true for the non-cooperative case. Thus the cooperative case is studied first as the
simpler one.
3 Cooperative game
Consider first the cooperative solution denoted as a social planner.
The social planner problem has the objective functional:
W
def
= max
~u(·),~g(·)
N∑
k
∫ ∞
0
e−rt
(∫ n(t)
0
[
qk(i, t)− 1
2
gk(i, t)
2
]
di− 1
2
uk(t)
2
)
dt. (11)
with dynamic constraints (2).
Limiting ourselves to N = 2 and after rearranging terms and combining integrals we get the
Hamiltonian function as:
HW =
∫ n(t)
0
[
q1(i, t) + q2(i, t)− 1
2
(
g21(i, t) + g
2
2(i, t
)]
di− 1
2
(
u21(t) + u
2
2(t)
)
+
+ λW (α1u1(t) + α2u2(t)− δn(t))+
+
∫ n∗
0
[φ1 (ψ1(i)g1(i, t)− βq1(i, t)) + φ2 (ψ2(i)g2(i, t)− βq2(i, t) + θ(q1(i, t)− q2(i, t))] di+
+
∫ n(t)
n∗
[φ1 (ψ1(i)g1(i, t)− βq1(i, t) + θ(q2(i, t)− q1(i, t)) + φ2 (ψ2(i)g2(i, t)− βq2(i, t))] di
(12)
Proceeding as in the baseline model, we get the canonical system for n dynamics as:
n˙ = ((α1)
2 + (α2)
2)λW − δn,
λ˙W = (r + δ)λW − 1
2

ψ1n+γ1
(r+β)2
+ ψ2n+γ2
(r+β+θ)2
, if n < n∗;
ψ1n+γ1
(r+β+θ)2
+ ψ2n+γ2
(r+β)2
, if n > n∗
(13)
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which turns to be a 2-dimensional one irrespective of the number of firms. Denote by the upper
(lower) regime of the game the time period such that n(t) > n∗(n(t) < n∗) and associated
dynamical systems by f+, f−.
The system (13) has unique steady states for each of the regimes, denoted {nˆ±, uˆ±1 , uˆ±2 } with
superscripts + for upper and − for lower regimes respectively.
Assume the system is non-singular and associated steady-states are (saddle) stable5. Due to
the piecewise character of the dynamics apart from standard upper and low regimes dynamics
it may possess an additional sliding dynamics, once the sliding region is non-empty.
Definition 4. The sliding region SL of the state-space of (13) is the range λW at n = n
∗
(switching manifold) such that
SL := {λW , n∗} : λ˙+W |n=n∗ < 0, λ˙−W |n=n∗ > 0 (14)
The escaping region ES of the state space of (13) is the geometric place of points:
ES := {λW , n∗} : λ˙+W |n=n∗ > 0, λ˙−W |n=n∗ < 0 (15)
Otherwise the region is called a crossing region.
So the sliding region is a part of the line n = n∗ where both regimes’ dynamics point into
the switching manifold n∗ and escaping region is where both regimes’ dynamics point out of
the switching manifold. The crossing region forms if the direction of dynamics coincide on both
sides of n∗.
Once the sliding region is non-empty it may contain the sliding mode6, defined as:
λ˙sW = (r + δ)λW −
(γ1ψ2 − γ2ψ1)
ψ2 − ψ1
r2 + (2β + θ)r + β2 + βθ + 12θ
2
(r + β + θ)2(r + β)2
(16)
which is a one-dimensional system with the equilibrium
λˆs =
(γ1ψ2 − γ2ψ1)
ψ2 − ψ1
r2 + (2β + θ)r + β2 + βθ + 12θ
2
(r + β + θ)2(r + β)2
1
r + δ
> 0 (17)
5if this is not the case, the problem either do not have a long-run solution (both steady states are unstable),
or this solution is uniquely defined (one stable steady state)
6the procedure to obtain the sliding dynamics is described in e. g. (Colombo and Jeffrey 2011) to which the
reader is referred for technical details.
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which is always an unstable one. The point {n∗, λˆs} is called the pseudoequilibrium of the
dynamical system (13) and thus of the game.
Still, it can be reached from the outside of the sliding mode by choosing appropriate u1(0), u2(0)
which are free. We first ask the question, under which conditions the cooperative game is in the
normal or switching mode, see Def. 3. We need additional definition:
Definition 5. The equilibrium of the upper (lower) regime of the game is regular, if nˆ+ >
n∗(nˆ− < n∗).
The equilibrium is virtual if nˆ+ < n∗(nˆ− > n∗).
The equilibrium is a boundary one if nˆ+ = n∗(nˆ− = n∗).
Denote nˆ±r and nˆ±v regular and virtual equilibria of the cooperative game respectively. Denote
further nˆss the Skiba (DNSS) point of the game, with the property that ∀ > 0 : W−(nss, 0) =
W+(nss, 0), W
−(nss − , 0) > W+(nss − , 0), W−(nss + , 0) < W+(nss + , 0),where +,−
superscripts denote the value of the (11) in upper and lower regimes respectively. The game
starting at nss is indifferent in converging to either of the equilibria while uniquely converging to
one of them off this threshold. We use this notion following (Wagener 2003) and similar papers.
We note that:
Lemma 1. The cooperative game given by (11), (2) is in the switching mode if one of the
following holds:
1. At least one of the cooperative steady states is virtual, and n0 < n
∗ < nˆ+r or n0 > n∗ > nˆ−r
2. Both equilibria are regular, but n∗ > n0 > nˆss > nˆ−r or n∗ < n0 < nˆss < nˆ+r .
Otherwise the cooperative game is in the normal mode.
Proof. If both equilibria are virtual, the only long-run dynamics is converging to the switching
manifold. If one is regular, the optimal trajectory would converge to it (as long as it is (saddle)
stable). Thus as soon as starting position is on the other side of the switching manifold, this
last will be visited at least once by the optimal trajectory.
At last, if both equilibria are regular, but the Skiba-point exists, it is optimal to converge to
the equilibrium lying at the other side of the n∗ by definition of the Skiba-point.
Note that this Skiba point is not the property of any of the sub-systems f+, f− which are
linear, but is an emergent property of the switching manifold. We thus refer to it (to distin-
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guish from normal Skiba point) as pseudo-Skiba point in analogue to pseudoequilibrium as an
equilibrium of the sliding flow7.
As soon as Lemma 1 holds, there are three qualitative types of dynamics:
1. The optimal trajectory visits the switching manifold finite number of times
2. The optimal trajectory converges to the switching manifold and stays there
3. There are infinitely many crossings of the switching manifold by the optimal trajectory
In the first case the optimality conditions are obtained in the same manner as in (Gromov
and Gromova 2017): we first determine the long-run outcome of the game, then define the
starting point at the switching manifold, which leads to the optimal trajectory, and compute
the remaining part as a fixed end-point free terminal time optimal control problem. Still, this
method is valid only if the switching event is a unique one. As soon as there are multiple
switches, more then one iteration may be necessary. Still, as long as this number stays finite,
the qualitative procedure is the same (but becomes computationally challenging).
In the second case n∗ realizes as a pseudo-equilibrium of the game and in the third case we
get the pseudo limit-cycle around the switching manifold (stable or unstable). Observe that so
far only the first type of dynamics has been considered in the dynamic games literature and we
are thus mainly interested in the two others.
We start with the second case.
Lemma 2. For the pseudoequilibrium to realize as the long-run outcome of the cooperative game
it is necessary that sliding region SL 6= ∅ and λˆs ∈ SL.
This is sufficient as long as either both nˆ± are virtual or W (nˆ±r , λˆ±r ,∞) < W (λˆs, n∗,∞).
Proof. The pseudoequilibrium is a feasible outcome of the game only if it exists. For this it is
necessary that sliding region is non-empty (sliding flow exists) and its equilibrium is within the
boundaries of this region.
If both equilibria of the game are virtual, this is the only possible long-run outcome of the
game. If at least one of them is regular, then by Lemma 1, for every n0 one of the equilibria
is selected. Then for convergence to the pseudoequilibrium to be optimal, it must yield higher
social welfare in total.
7defined further on
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Observe, that the Lemma 2 does not include stability requirements for the pseudoequilibrium.
Indeed, since this last is the equilibrium of the sliding flow and not of the original system, the
trajectory converging to this point will exist always as soon as sliding region is non-empty (by
definition of the sliding region).
For the sliding region of the cooperative game to be non-empty the following has to hold:
(α−1 )
2 + (α+2 )
2 < (α+1 )
2 + (α−2 )
2 (18)
i. e. the overall investments efficiency in the upper regime should be lower than in the lower
regime.
The equilibrium of the sliding flow λs is given by (17) and has to lie within λ+, λ− tangency
points, defined via n˙+|n=n∗ = 0 and n˙−|n=n∗ = 0 respectively:
λ+ =
δ(γ1 − γ2)
ψ2 − ψ1
1
(α−1 )2 + (α
+
2 )
2
, λ− =
δ(γ1 − γ2)
ψ2 − ψ1
1
(α+1 )
2 + (α−2 )2
(19)
Thus the first (necessary) condition of Lemma 2 can be expressed as
λ+ > λˆ
s > λ− (20)
The condition for social planner problem to have virtual steady states is:
nˆ+ < n∗ < nˆ− (21)
with expressions for steady states:
nˆ− =
(
(α+1 )
2 + (α−2 )
2
) (
1
2
γ1
(r+β)2
+ 12
γ2
(r+β+θ)2
)
(
δ(r + δ)− 12
(
(α+1 )
2 + (α−2 )2
) ( ψ1
(r+β)2
+ ψ2
(r+β+θ)2
))
nˆ+ =
(
(α−1 )
2 + (α+2 )
2
) (
1
2
γ1
(r+β+θ)2
+ 12
γ2
(r+β)2
)
(
δ(r + δ)− 12
(
(α−1 )2 + (α
+
2 )
2
) ( ψ1
(r+β+θ)2
+ ψ2
(r+β)2
)) (22)
It turns out that both (20) and (21) hold or not simultaneously: that is, either both equilibria
are virtual and sliding region exists with the pseudoequilibrium within it, either at least one of
the equilibria is regular and the pseudoequilibrium lies in the escaping region (and sliding region
is empty). We thus do not have to check optimality via value functions comparison, but rather
look at the configuration of steady states of the overall problem. Figures 1, 2 illustrate these
two situations with all parameters normalized to one except for α+1 = 0.5, ψ1 = 0.1 and α
+
2 , γ2
varying from zero to one.
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(a) Location of steady states (b) Location of pseudoequilibrium
Figure 1: α+2 = 0.2, γ2 ∈ [0.897, 0.9147] : Pseudoequilibrium is feasible and optimal
In the Figure 1 there exists a sliding region for any γ2. For γ2 ∈ [0.897, 0.9147] it contains the
pseudoequilibrium and both original system’s steady states are virtual. Thus the only long-run
outcome is convergence to the pseudoequilibrium both from the upper and lower regimes. Out
of this range one equilibrium is always virtual and the other one is real while pseudoequilibrium
is not contained in the sliding region, so convergence is uniquely given by n0 for any γ2.
In the Figure 2 for any γ2 only the escaping region exists, and it contains the pseudoequi-
librium for γ2 ∈ [0.88, 0.9]. It may be reached only by setting n0 = n∗. At the same time, for
γ2 in this range both equilibria are regular ones and outside this range one is always virtual.
Thus the unique convergence is granted for γ2 /∈ [0.88, 0.9]: the regular equilibrium is selected
(perhaps with finitely many switches). At the same time once γ2 ∈ [0.88, 0.9], one or the other
equilibrium is reached provided n0 6= n∗ and the location of the Skiba point (if it exists).
We also note here:
Lemma 3. As long as the escaping region is non-empty and steady states are regular and
saddle-stable, switching dynamics cannot be optimal.
Proof. As we discussed, the existence of the escaping region implies both equilibria are regular.
Once n0 < n
∗ for certainty, it might be the case, that convergence to the upper steady state
implies higher social welfare W . Still to do so, the optimal trajectory in the upper regime should
follow the stable manifold of the upper steady state. If this is a saddle, there exists a single such
trajectory, converging from given n0 to nˆ
+. If the initial value is below n∗, the upper part of
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(a) Location of steady states (b) Location of pseudoequilibrium
Figure 2: α+2 = 0.7, γ2 ∈ [0.88, 0.9] : Pseudoequilibrium is never feasible except for n0 = n∗
solution implies n(t∗) = n∗, i. e. final part of the optimal trajectory should start at the switching
manifold. But as long as escaping region exists, the stable manifolds of both equilibria start at
the escaping region, and thus the optimal trajectory crossing from lower to the upper cannot be
found. Thus the only optimal outcome is convergence to the equilibrium of the regime, where
n0 is located.
Using this observation we claim that the third type of dynamics cannot occur in the coop-
erative game (11), (2):
Lemma 4. In cooperative game either one of regular equilibria realizes, or pseudoequilibrium
realizes if both equilibria are virtual ones.
Proof. By Lemma 2 we know that pseudoequilibrium realizes only if the sliding region is non-
empty and both equilibria are virtual. If one of those is real and the other virtual, no pseudoe-
quilibrium exists and the only possible outcome is the regular steady state. If both are regular,
there exists an escaping region and by Lemma 3 the game is in the normal mode. To rule out
the third (quasi-periodic) type of dynamics, observe that for it to be the case, folds have to be
formed from both sides of the switching manifold, and they have to coincide, i. e. λ+ = λ−.
But this can be the case only if (α−1 )
2 + (α+2 )
2 = (α+1 )
2 + (α−2 )
2 implying escaping/sliding region
consists of this fold point only. But then the optimal trajectory reaching to the desirable steady
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state of the original system can always be found and even if the quasi periodic motion exists, it
cannot be an optimal outcome.
Then we have:
Proposition 1. If both steady states of the social problem are virtual ones, the only socially
optimal outcome is the unstable pseudoequilibrium {λˆsW , n∗}.
It is feasible if and only if
λˆsW ∈ [λ−, λ+] (23)
otherwise one of two regular equilibria realizes and the game is in the normal mode.
Proof. First claim follows from the fact that the pseudoequilibrium is the only possible long-run
steady state (as system is linear) and it is optimal to converge to the steady state by definition
of it. The second claim follows from lemma 1 and the fact that the pseudoequilibrium is feasible
from the outside of the sliding region only if it lies within the sliding region.
The rest follows from the preceeding analysis.
Both switching-type and normal dynamics for the cooperative game are illustrated by direc-
tion fields at the Figure 3
(a) Two virtual equilibria (b) Two regular equilibria
Figure 3: Two possible outcomes of the cooperative 2-firms game
Figure 3a shows the situation when starting from any side of n∗ optimal dynamics inevitably
reaches the pseudoequilibrium, since booth regimes cannot reach their respective equilibria.
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Figure 3b illustrates the normal situation, when no switching may occur and one of the regular
equilibria is selected.
Our analysis has so far demonstrated that in the studied cooperative 2-players R&D game
there is always a unique equilibrium (solution). It can be either the permanent technological
leadership of one of the firms or the pseudo equilibrium situation, whereas no firm is the leader
and thus no imitation may happen. This last outcome is generic and happens for a positive
range of parameters. In particular, if initial follower has sufficiently low investment efficiency
as a leader, it might be optimal to ’freeze’ the dynamics at the boundary between the regimes,
since this yields the maximal sustainable level of variety n∗.
At last we observe that the outcome of the cooperative game is invariant to the number of
participating firms. Indeed, the aggregate dynamics is characterized as a 2-dimensional system
for any N and there are no qualitatively new types of dynamics for such a game. This is known
as a topological equivalence property:
Corollary 1. Any N ∈ N-player cooperative game type (13) is topologically equivalent to a two-
persons game, i. e. either regular or pseudoequilbrium type k realises as the long-run outcome
without any quasi-periodic solutions.
The likelihood of the pseudoequilirbium as an outcome comes down with N increase.
If N →∞ only pseudoequilibrium may realize as an outcome.
Proof. For any natural N the dynamical system is 2-dimensional but with N separate regimes of
different firms’ leadership (in the sense of Def. 2). Each regime is thus fully equivalent to upper-
lower regime of the original (13) 2-persons game. The only difference comes in the multiplicity of
switching manifolds. As such for any pairwise neighboring regimes the dynamics is the same as
above with the only difference that pseudoequilibrium may realize only if all regimes’ equilibria
are virtual, which becomes less likely the more regimes are there.
The last claim follows from the fact that with N → ∞ the phase space consists solely of
switching manifolds and thus the only long-run outcome is the realisation of (the nearest to n0)
pseudo equilibrium.
We thus observe that for a cooperative solution the number of participating firms may play
stabilizing role as long as this number is finite, since this helps to select the regular (thus optimal)
equilibrium as an outcome, while if there are infinitely many firms, the regular outcome cannot
be reached. This finding agrees with (Bondarev and Greiner 2017), whereas the same claim
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has been made for decentralized system with symmetric efficiencies but non-linear dynamics. It
turns out, that it is the piecewise nature (multiple modes of the game present) of the system
which is crucial for the optimality and not the precise type of the underlying dynamical system
regimes themselves.
4 Non-cooperative game
We now consider the decentralised system. In this case the problem is given as a differential
game with players’ objectives (1) and dynamics (2). We start with the minimal example of two
firms, k ∈ {1, 2}. For simplicity we normalize γ1 > γ2 > 0 and 0 < ψ1 < ψ2 such that firm 1 has
initial advantage in efficiency but as range of technologies progresses, the other firm catches up.
There is only one such regime shift, and the range where firm 1 is the leader, i1 or firm 2, i2 are
defined as:
i1 : [0, n
∗), i2 : (n∗,∞), n∗ = γ1 − γ2
ψ2 − ψ1 (24)
and we again term the regime whereas n(t) ∈ i1 the lower regime and n(t) ∈ i2 the upper regime
of the R&D system.
Proceeding as in the baseline model we next define dynamics of the R&D system in both
regimes:
∀t : n(t) < n∗ : f− :=

n˙−(t) = (α+1 u1(t) + α
−
2 u2(t))− δn(t)
u˙−1 (t) = α
+
1 (r + δ)u1(t)− α+1 ψ1n(t)+γ1(r+β)2
u˙−2 (t) = α
−
2 (r + δ)u2(t)− α−2 ψ2n(t)+γ2(r+β+θ)2
(25)
∀t : n(t) > n∗ : f+ :=

n˙+(t) = (α−1 u1(t) + α
+
2 u2(t))− δn(t)
u˙+1 (t) = α
−
1 (r + δ)u1(t)− α−1 ψ1n(t)+γ1(r+β+θ)2
u˙+2 (t) = α
+
2 (r + δ)u2(t)− α+2 ψ2n(t)+γ2(r+β)2
(26)
Denote the steady states of both systems as {n¯±, u¯±1 , u¯±2 } points where the system (25) or (26)
has zero change. By construction both regimes have unique steady-states as long as both systems
are non-singular.
We thus assume:
Assumption 1. Jacobians of f−, f+ are of full rank
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We also require
Assumption 2. Both {n¯±, u¯±1 , u¯±2 } are stable or saddle-type, i. e. the Jacobians of both systems
f−, f+ at their respective equilibria have at least one negative eigenvalue.
These assumptions are not restrictive, since otherwise there are no long-run equilibria in the
game.
Linearity of both f+, f− implies no Skiba points exist (no multi-stability) for both sub-
systems but the overall system may possess the (pseudo)Skiba-point as discussed in the previous
section. Since investments are optimally chosen, only the stable sub-manifold of the associated
equilibrium will be selected as an optimal trajectory of the system. Such stable sub-manifolds
exist only if equilibria are stable or of the saddle-type. From now on we refer to the set of
players, objectives (1) and dynamics (25)–(26) as the non-cooperative game.
Since investments are optimal controls of the firms, we also need transversality conditions.
We define them as follows:
lim
t→∞ e
−rtu1,2(t) = 0 (27)
Under given assumptions it follows that we can characterize these modes by the configuration
of steady states and initial position of the game:
Lemma 5. Under Assumptions 1, 2:
1. Either n¯− < n∗ < n¯+ or max{n¯−, n¯+} < n∗, n(0) < n∗ or min{n¯−, n¯+} > n∗, n(0) > n∗,
and the game is in the normal mode
2. Either n¯− > n∗ > n¯+, or max{n¯−, n¯+} < n∗, n(0) > n∗ or max{n¯−, n¯+} > n∗, n(0) < n∗,
and the game is in the switching mode.
Proof. This is equivalent of Lemma 1 but for the 3-dimensional decentralised system.
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We are mostly interested in the case when n¯− > n∗ > n¯+, since in all other cases the switch
occurs at most once8. For such configuration of the system to hold the condition is
1
2
(
γ1 (α
+
1 )
2
(r+β)2
+
γ2 (α
−
2 )
2
(r+β+θ)2
)
(
δ(r + δ)− 12
(
ψ1 (α
+
1 )
2
(r+β)2
+
ψ2 (α
−
2 )
2
(r+β+θ)2
)) >
>
γ1 − γ2
ψ2 − ψ1 >
1
2
(
γ1 (α
−
1 )
2
(r+β+θ)2
+
γ2 (α
+
2 )
2
(r+β)2
)
(
δ(r + δ)− 12
(
ψ1 (α
−
1 )
2
(r+β+θ)2
+
ψ2 (α
+
2 )
2
(r+β)2
)) (28)
i. e. both regimes have only virtual (in the sense of Def. 5) equilibria. This is just the condition
on investment efficiencies. We observe that
Lemma 6. As long as (28) holds and both equilibria are (saddle-type) stable, system converges
to the switching manifold in finite time from any n(0) and stays locally in the neighbourhood of
n∗ for infinite time.
Proof. It follows from the linearity of the system: once (28) holds, no long-run equilibrium may
be reached (both are virtual) and no heteroclinic connections across steady states may exist.
At the same time optimality implies that V1(n¯
+) > V1(n¯
−) and V2(n¯+) < V2(n¯−) where Vk(n¯i)
denotes the value (maximized discounted profit stream) of firm k in steady state i respectively.
Thus from the lower regime system will always converge towards the upper and vice versa. The
only long-run trajectories which are compatible are either cycling around the switching manifold,
or end up at the pseudoequilibrium within it.
Lemma 6 implies that it is important to study the dynamics only near the switching manifold.
However general theory tells us that behaviour around the switching manifold may be more or
less complicated. In particular, we are interested in the generic behaviour qualitatively different
from the cooperative case. It turns out, that if only one sliding/escaping region exists for
the non-cooperative game, dynamics is qualitatively similar to the cooperative case: either
pseudoequilibrium realizes or one of the regular steady states. Still in 3 dimensions there exists
another (and more generic) possibility, called the two-fold.
8provided assumption on both steady states are (saddle-type) stable, arguments are the same as for the
cooperative game case
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Lemma 7. The dynamics near the switching region is characterized by the two-fold once it holds
∃!(u∗1, u∗2) > 0 :
α
+
1 u1 + α
−
2 u2 − δn∗ = 0,
α−1 u1 + α
+
2 u2 − δn∗ = 0
(29)
In particular, both sliding and escaping regions are 2-dimensional and there exists two 2-dimensional
crossing regions.
Proof. The condition (29) just says that tangent lines at n∗ are in general position and intersect
once. This intersection point is
u∗1 =
α−2 − α+2
α−1 α
−
2 − α+1 α+2
δn∗, u∗2 =
α−1 − α+1
α−1 α
−
2 − α+1 α+2
δn∗ (30)
defined by asymmetry of investment efficiencies across regimes. Since we assume α−k > α
+
k this
point implies positive u∗1, u∗2 for positive n∗. The triple u∗1, u∗2, n∗ defines the location of the
two-fold, but not its type. Once such an intersection is unique, the tangent lines (29) define a
partitioning of the switching manifold into exactly four regions.
These regions are sets of investments {u1, u2} > 0 defined by:
CR1 := {u1, u2} : α±1 u1 + α±2 u2 − δn∗ > 0;
CR2 := {u1, u2} : α±1 u1 + α±2 u2 − δn∗ < 0,
ES := {u1, u2} : α+1 u1 + α−2 u2 − δn∗ < 0, α−1 u1 + α+2 u2 − δn∗ > 0
SL := {u1, u2} : α+1 u1 + α−2 u2 − δn∗ > 0, α−1 u1 + α+2 u2 − δn∗ < 0. (31)
which are crossing regions CR1, CR2 and escaping (ES) and sliding (SL) regions defined in the
same way as in Def. 4.
The type of the two-fold is given by the sign of the second Lie derivative, at this point defined
by (24) and (30). Applied to our example we get
L2f−(n∗) :=
1
2
(
2 (r + β)2 (r + δ)u∗1 − α+1 n∗ψ1
)
α+1
(r + β)2
+
1
2
(
2 (r + β + θ)2 (r + δ)u∗2 − α−2 n∗ψ2
)
α−2
(r + β + θ)2
L2f+(n∗) :=
1
2
(
2 (r + β + θ)2 (r + δ)u∗1 − α−1 n∗ψ1
)
α−1
(r + β + θ)2
+
1
2
(
2 (r + β)2 (r + δ)u∗2 − α+2 n∗ψ2
)
α+2
(r + β)2
(32)
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where {n∗, u∗1, u∗2} is the two-fold point.
For convenience we normalize coefficients such that γ1 = 1, ψ2 = 1, δ = 1, r = 1, β = 1 as in
cooperative case and set α+1 = 1, α
+
2 = 1. The sign of normalized Lie derivatives depend on the
quadratic polynomials in investment efficiencies:
ψ1(2 + θ)
2(α+1 )
2 + 4(α−2 )
2 − 16(2 + θ)2 Q 0↔ L2f−(n∗) R 0,
1
4
(2 + θ)2(α+2 )
2 + (α−1 )
2ψ1 − 4(2 + θ)2 Q 0↔ L2f+(n∗) R 0 (33)
We get
Lemma 8. There exist non-empty parameters range such that for γ2 < γ1, ψ1 < ψ2 it holds
L2f−h(n∗) > 0,L2f+h(n∗) < 0, i. e. the two-fold exhibits the Teixeira singularity.
Proof. It suffices to find such a combination of parameters. With normalization as above the
Figure 4 provides the range of the follower investment efficiencies such that the non-cooperative
game exhibits Teixeira singularity:
Figure 4: Range of α−1 , α
−
2 for Teixeira singularity
So this singularity appears to be generic: once sufficient asymmetry in investment efficiencies
is observed, one would expect the appearance of this complex behavior. The importance of
Teixeira singularity stems from the fact that this is the only type of the two-fold which is
asymptotically stable: trajectories may stay near the switching manifold infinitely long. For
other types of the two-fold this is not the case and the trajectory will eventually leave the
neighbourhood of a singularity.
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For the optimal trajectory to lead into the neighbourhood of this singularity both only virtual
steady states should exist and Teixeira singularity. There exists a range of efficiencies for which
this is possible, but this range is smaller, as Figure 5 shows.
Figure 5: Range of α−1 , α
−
2 for Teixeira singularity and two virtual equilibria
These range of parameters define the partition of the switching manifold as illustrated by
Figure 6.
Figure 6: Partition of the switching manifold in regions
We next define the sliding flow following the Filippov convex method:
fs = f− +
Lf−n∗
Lf−n∗ − Lf+n∗
(f+ − f−) (34)
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where Lf±n∗ are given by n(t) dynamics at fixed n∗. This sliding flow is 2-dimensional but
highly non-linear:
u˙s1 = α
+
1 (r + δ)u1 −
1
2
α+1 C1 +
α+1 u1 + α
−
2 u2 − δ n∗
(α+1 − α−1 )u1 + (α−2 − α+2 )u2
((
α−1 − α+1
)
(r + δ)u1 − 1
2
α−1 C2 +
1
2
α+1 C1
)
u˙s2 = α
−
2 (r + δ)u2 −
1
2
α−2 C3 +
α+1 u1 + α
−
2 u2 − δ n∗
(α+1 − α−1 )u1 + (α−2 − α+2 )u2
((
α+2 − α−2
)
(r + δ)u2 − 1
2
α+2 C3 +
1
2
α−2 C4
)
(35)
where C1 =
ψ1 n∗+γ1
(r+β)2
, C2 =
ψ1 n∗+γ1
(r+β+θ)2
, C3 =
ψ2 n∗+γ2
(r+β)2
, C4 =
ψ2 n∗+γ2
(r+β+θ)2
are constants depending
on investment efficiencies functions in qualities and imitation speed. This sliding flow might
have associated equilibrium which is called pseudoequilibrium of the original system:
Definition 6. The equilibrium {us1, us2} of the sliding flow (35) such that n = n∗, u˙s1,2 = 0 and
{us1, us2} ∈ ES ∪ SL is called the pseudoequilibrium of the system (26)-(25).
Observe that once the last condition is violated, the system (35) has an equilibrium located
in one of the crossing regions and this cannot be reached by the sliding flow, since this exists
only within the ES ∪ SL. Moreover if {us1, us2} ∈ ES this is a virtual pseudoequilibrium: it
cannot be reached by the sliding flow, since in the escaping region the flow does not exist in
forward time, leaving it immediately upon entrance.
Next, following (Colombo and Jeffrey 2011) we have classification of dynamics around Teix-
eira singularity9:
Proposition 2.
Under conditions of Lemmas 6, 7, 8 the following types of long-run dynamics are possible:
1. (stable) Limit cycle around the singularity
2. If this is unstable, then:
(a) If the pseudoequilibrium is (saddle-type) stable with {us1, us2} ∈ SL, the system ends
up in the pseudoequilibrium of the sliding flow at {n¯s = n∗, u¯s1, u¯s2}
(b) If the pseudoequilibrium is unstable or {us1, us2} ∈ ES∪CR1∪CR2, the system evolves
unpredictably around the singularity point with expected average position E∞(n, u1, u2) =
{n∗, u∗1, u∗2}
9I omit all standard types of dynamics possible once some of Lemmas 6-8 do not hold, since these can be
described via the same mechanics as in (Gromov and Gromova 2017).
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Proof. In the paper (Colombo and Jeffrey 2011) ten different types of dynamics are reported.
Still under condition of (28) the system cannot escape the neighbourhood of the switching
manifold, thus eventually it will hit the sliding region which exists due to (29). In the sliding
region we either get stable or unstable equilibrium (pseudoequilibrium). If it is (saddle-type)
stable, only those trajectories which lie in the stable sub-manifold are optimal and the system
ends up in this position. If it is unstable it lies in the escaping region and all orbits from
the sliding region are passing through the singularity point, implying non-deterministic chaotic
behavior. If this is the case, all orbits recurrently visit the singularity point, but intersect only
at that point, hence E∞(n, u1, u2) = {n∗, u∗1, u∗2}.
The Proposition 2 implies that once the system has two virtual equilibria, there are three
potential types of associated inefficiency:
1. First, the system ends up not in one of the long-run steady states, but in between those
two.
2. Second, it might permanently fluctuate around the singularity point in predictable manner,
implying some technologies are constantly re-invented and scrapped and firms fight for the
technological leadership
3. Third, these fluctuations may become fully unpredictable exhibiting non-deterministic
chaotic behavior10, i. e. at each point in time none of the players may predict the dynamics
for more than some τ time, where τ is the period between recurrent visits of the singularity
point by the system. At this point the memory is erased, and the new (unpredictable)
cycle starts.
The first inefficiency is stemming from the multi-modality of the game itself: the presence of
imitation and its scope define this effect. This inefficiency may be corrected by usual subsidizing
schemes, defined via for example, IDP (imputation distribution procedure) as in (Petrosjan and
Zaccour 2003), since both decentralized and cooperative dynamics are of the same type (even if
cooperative game yields pseudo equilibrium as an outcome). Moreover, this type of dynamics is
topologically invariant to the number of firms and has the same properties as the cooperative
solution described by Corollary 1.
10Roughly speaking, non-deterministic chaos is a set-valued flow, while standard chaotic dynamics is determin-
istic extremely sensitive to initial conditions. See (Colombo and Jeffrey 2011) for definition.
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The second one is a bit more complex, since it requires varying and state-dependent subsi-
dies/transfers for correction. Indeed, since firms constantly change their relative leadership, the
subsidy has to be defined relative to this leadership. However theoretically such a corrective
policy is feasible. Still, the topological equivalence of the cooperative and non-cooperative sys-
tem is already lost, since pseudo-limit cycles are possible only for non-cooperative game (this is
a 3-dimensional phenomenon).
The third one is of completely new type, since it stems from the endogenous uncertainty of
the dynamics of the game. It is much harder to correct by specific state-based subsidies, since
the state is in general not known in advance even to firms themselves. Thus we naturally get
the second-best case: some constant or approximate subsidizing schemes may implement the
pseudoequilibrium (from which the normal first-best subsidy can be used), but there are non-
negligible welfare losses on this route. In this paper we do not tackle the question how this third
type of inefficiency may be corrected since it turns out to be non-generic for a linear-quadratic
setting considered here.
Now observe that the model (26),(25) cannot generate this last type of inefficiency.
Proposition 3. The decentralised R&D game does not exhibit non-deterministic chaos as long
as it is linear-quadratic in each of the modes and there are no cross-players strategic interactions.
Proof. Indeed for it to occur, the angles between flows and their fold lines, θ+, θ− in the upper
and lower regimes should be such that cot θ+ cot θ− > 1 and cot θ+, cot θ− < 0 given by second
mixed Lie derivatives of flows around the singularity point {n∗, u∗1, u∗2}:
V + := cot θ+ =
Lf+Lf−(n∗)√
−
(
L2f+n∗
)(
L2f−n∗
)
V − := cot θ− =
−Lf−Lf+(n∗)√
−
(
L2f+n∗
)(
L2f−n∗
) (36)
and additional parameter
a∗ = α−1 V
+ +
α+2
V +
− α+1 (V +)2 − α−2 (37)
should be negative (according to (Colombo and Jeffrey 2011)).
In the current setup this cannot be the case, since once cross-investments impacts are zero,
a∗ < 0 as long as V + < 0, as simple algebra shows.
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Figure 7: Sign of cotangents of angles between flows
Comparing Eqs. (28) and (22) yields the observation:
Lemma 9. nˆ− > n¯− as long as
(α−2 )
2γ1(r + β + θ)
2 + (α+1 )
2γ2(r + β)
2 >
1
2
((α−2 )
4 − (α+1 )4)(ψ2γ1 − ψ1γ2) > 0 (38)
holds. nˆ+ < n¯+ holds as long as
(α+2 )
2γ1(r + β)
2 + (α−1 )
2γ2(r + β + θ)
2 >
1
2
((α−1 )
4 − (α+2 )4)(ψ2γ1 − ψ1γ2) < 0 (39)
holds.
As long as both (38), (39) hold and both non-cooperative equilibria are virtual, both socially
optimal steady states are also virtual.
Proof. Both inequalities follow from direct substraction of (28) from (22). If those hold, both
social and decentralised steady states are virtual.
This immediately implies
Corollary 2. As long as the non-cooperative game admits pseudoequilibrium as the optimal
solution, the same holds for the socially optimal solution.
Proof. As long as the decentralized system exhibits convergence to the pseudoequilibrium it has
two virtual equilibria. Then by Lemma 9 the cooperative game also have two virtual equilibria.
The only outcome for the cooperative game with two virtual equilibria is the convergence to the
pseudoequilibrium (by Lemma 2).
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The analysis here has shown that in the decentralized system of piecewise linear-quadratic
type the non-deterministic chaos is not possible. However the Teixeira singularity forms gener-
ically and once this is the case, two types of dynamics are possible: convergence to the pseudo
equilibrium or stable pseudo-limit cycles around the singularity point. These two types are
schematically illustrated by the Figure 8.
(a) Two virtual equilibria (b) Two regular equilibria
Figure 8: Two possible outcomes of the non-cooperative 2-firms game around Teixeira singularity
The first type corresponds to the pseudoequilibrium of the cooperative solution (Corr. 2)
and as such may be implemented through the IDP approach with value functions of players as in
(Petrosjan and Zaccour 2003). The second type is new and implies the necessity for time-varying
transfers/subsidies, since the decentralized system never comes into any equilibrium (including
the pseudoequilibrium).
The last point to consider is the prospect of generalization of the 2-players noncooperative
game to theN -players setup. It turns out that the result equivalent to the Corr. 1 is impossible to
obtain. The reason for this is that increasing the number of players increases the dimensionality
of the system and it cannot be reduced as in the baseline setting (which is a special degenerate
case). That is, resulting dynamical systems are not topologically equivalent.
Corollary 3. As long as the decentralised game is asymmetric, i. e. ∃i 6= j : α+i 6= α−i , any
N + 1-players game cannot be described by reducing dimensionality to N dimensions.
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Proof. Once ∃i 6= j : α+i 6= α−i holds, shadow costs of investments for each player differ,
implying impossibility to aggregate uj(t) dynamics. Then any additionally player will increase
the dimensionality of the dynamical system and topological equivalence is not preserved since
the multi-modality of the game.
This last result has important consequences. In cooperative game (i. e. centralised solu-
tion) the number of players does not affect the qualitative type of dynamics, changing only the
likelihood of one or another outcome- On the contrary in decentralized equilibrium the higher
is the number of players, the more complicated and diverse is the dynamics. Already with 3
players one gets a 4-dimensional non-reducible dynamical system of piecewise type, which does
not have full classification of potential dynamic types until now. We thus may conclude that:
Corollary 4. With increasing number of asymmetric players the relative efficiency of the coop-
erative solution in comparison with the non-cooperative one goes up and efficiency of regulation
goes down.
It is important to note that this concerns only asymmetric players. If these are symmetric
we get the familiar structure of monopolistic competition with all regulation tools being fairly
well know. Still the structure considered here is not of that type, since heterogeneity of players
and may be referred to as the heterogeneous competition.
In particular, this includes a monopoly within a competitive fringe: if we denote monopoly
as player 1 and all (symmetric) small firms as an aggregated player 2, we obtain exactly the
structure studied above. If all firms are symmetric (perfect competition case) we obtain the
degenerate case of the baseline model qualitatively similar to the cooperative solution. However
once we have more than two asymmetric players, dynamics cannot be reduced to 3 dimensions
and has to be studied further.
5 Generalizations
The results of the above analysis are easily extended to generic piecewise-smooth games linear-
quadratic (LQ) in each of the modes.
First we characterize when one might expect the emergence of the non-deterministic chaos
and when not. To this end assume the dynamics of the 2-persons game is given by the linear
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ODE system type (26)-(25):
x˙ = a±11x+ a
±
12u1 + a
±
13u2 (40)
u˙1 = a
±
21x+ a
±
22u1 + a
±
23u2 (41)
u˙2 = a
±
31x+ a
±
32u1 + a
±
33u2 (42)
where x is the state variable, u1, u2 are (optimal) strategies of players, a
±
ij are constant coefficients
of impact by variable j on variable i in the upper (+) and lower (−) regimes of the game. We
immediately recover our original game by setting a23, a32 to zero, i. e. assuming away any
dynamic impact of strategies on each other. We then get a remarkably simple result:
Proposition 4. In the LQ bi-modal 2-players game nondeterministic chaos is possible only if
a23, a32 6= 0 in (41)-(42). Otherwise no chaotic dynamics can be observed and all dynamics
around the T-singularity (if it exists) is exhausted by the equivalent to Prop. 2.
Proof. Indeed, once a23, a32 = 0 there cannot be the situation such that simultaneously V
+ < 0
and a∗ < 0 given by (36) and (37) respectively. At the same time this is necessary to have a non-
deterministic chaotic dynamics. Once this is absent, the two other possible types of dynamics
around the singularity are given by the equivalent of Prop. 2.
Observe that this does not extend to N -players LQ games, since those can have up to N
modes and N dimensional dynamical system may exhibit completely different types of dynamics
(still not fully studied). However this gives a hint that complex dynamics can be achieved already
with two players, once cross-strategies feedbacks are allowed for.
The second general result concerns the topological equivalence of cooperative and non-
cooperative games.
Proposition 5. Assume the LQ bi-modal game given by dynamics (40)-(42). Then it holds:
1. Cooperative game is always described by the two-dimensional system and its equilibria types
are qualitatively invariant to the number of players N ;
2. Non-cooperative game is described by the N -dimensional system and thus its equilibria are
qualitatively different in N
3. As long as in the N -players system type (40)-(42) it holds that ∀i ∈ N : a+1i = a−1i, the
non-cooperative game is topologically equivalent to a 2-dimensional system for any finite
N .
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Proof. Point 1 is direct consequence of Corr. 1. Point 2 is consequence of the fact that non-
cooperative game exhibit new types of dynamics already for N = 2 and this propagates further
(e. .g with N = 3 there can be so-called cubic tangency points, implying other types of singulari-
ties). Point 3 is an observation, that once all investments efficiencies are the same across regimes,
we can always aggregate investments into one variable int he same way as for the cooperative
solution and get the 2-dimensional system in the same way as in the benchmark model.
Now the question of interest remains: what are possible classes of (economically meaningful)
dynamic games which may exhibit the non-deterministic chaotic behavior? The analysis so far
revealed that it does not suffice to have asymmetric players, but rather the optimal strategies
of those should be interdependent. That is, strategies have to be not pure state-feedback ones,
but interdependent.
For example, if the variety expansion dynamics will include a knowledge spillover,
n˙ = (α±1 u1(t) + α
±
2 u2(t))(1 + n(t))− δn(t) (43)
strategies of firms would become interdependent and non-deterministic chaos is possible. How-
ever, this type of dynamics makes the game a non-linear one and explicit solution is difficult to
obtain.
It thus remains open for future research, how large is the class of games which may exhibit this
additional property. It can be conjectured however, that any game with Stackelberg leadership
would belong to this class, since it is known (see e. g. (Dockner, Jorgensen, Long, and Sorger
2000)) that optimal strategies for such games are interdependent.
6 Conclusions
In this paper the consequences of introducing asymmetry in investments into the multi-modal
R&D game are studied. The analysis reveals that for centralized solution the dynamics is
qualitatively similar to that studied in (Bondarev and Greiner 2017), while for decentralized
dynamics this is not the case.
In particular cooperative game may exhibit only two types of dynamics irrespective of the
number of firms, while decentralised game has increasingly complex dynamics if number of
firms increase. For the simplest 2-players setup we already may observe permanent fluctuations
around the switching point as well as convergence to the intermittent pseudo-equilibrium. The
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last case is equivalent to the cooperative game outcome but the first one cannot be observed in
the cooperative game and requires time-varying subsidies to be regulated.
Potentially this setup may exhibit even more complex behavior known as non-deterministic
chaos, but once we restrict attention to linear-quadratic games, this cannot happen. The pres-
ence of additional spillovers across players’ strategies may lead to this type of behavior which
would require the development of novel regulation tools.
At last it is demonstrated that the generality of results obtained are far exceeding the partic-
ular model considered in the major part of the paper. That is for any linear-quadratic bi-modal
game it holds that cooperative and non-cooperative outcomes may be topologically equivalent
(have the same number and type of equilibria) only if players are symmetric with respect to
their investment efficiencies. Otherwise the non-cooperative dynamics is more complex, the
more players are in the game.
At last, necessary condition for the non-deterministic chaos in any game described by a
linear differential system has been obtained. Strategies (investments) of players have to be
interdependent and not only asymmetric for this type of dynamics to be observed.
This study raises two important questions for future research. First, how much competition in
R&D-oriented industry is optimal? According to current paper’s results, presence of additional
innovators may switch the dynamics to a chaotic one, whereas no one may predict the long-run
behavior, so caution may be needed in promoting the R&D competition for asymmetric firms.
Second, what type of regulation may be appropriate for a given industry? It turns out that
constant or state-based subsidies are relevant only for the simplest type of dynamics, whereas
for sufficiently asymmetric players it becomes time-dependent and even switching. Further
research in this direction is apparently necessary to have detailed answers on this policy-oriented
questions.
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